Wild rhesus monkeys have been found to attend to causal anomalies, suggesting that they make inferences about possible and impossible physical transformations in the absence of direct relevant experience.
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Causality and how we understand it have been the subject of intense scholarly debate. The eighteenth century Scottish philosopher David Hume (see [1, 2] ) influentially argued that all we know is that one event repeatedly occurs after another -for example, a ball moves after being hit by another -and we call this causation, but we cannot see or logically demonstrate cause-effect connections, the impression of causation derives from repeated experience. In contrast, others [1, 3] have suggested that the notion of cause is a primitive of the human mind through which we make sense of experience, including novel events.
Indeed, humans know that certain things will or will not happen without having experienced them. For example, I know that by throwing my mobile phone, but not my wallet, I may break a window glass, without having actually tried this ever. We can predict this on the basis of the physical properties of the objects involved -glass is fragile and breakable, my mobile is hard, whereas my wallet is soft. In some cases our ability to predict novel outcomes likely derives from the vast number of experiences, with an extraordinary variety of objects, we accumulate over a lifetime. But some impressions of causality, such as the launching effect of a ball hitting another, might require little or no experience -indeed, 6-month-old human infants show awareness of such effects [4] . Do other animals have such a sense of causality? Ever since scientists started to study animal minds, they debated whether animals blindly learn to associate actions with outcomes through repeated experience, or react insightfully to new situations. In effect, the animal intelligence debate is about whether animals can or cannot understand the causal connections between actions and objects [5] . Some suggest that even chimpanzees, with their well-known tool-using skills, commit too many glaring errors in experimental tasks to be credited with genuine causal understanding [6] . Others argue that chimpanzees show a natural sense of causality, even outside the tool-using domain: for example, they choose containers that make a noise when shaken as the ones that must contain food, but find it difficult to learn an arbitrary cue, such as a tapping sound, associated with food containers, even after repeated experience [7] . This suggests that they spontaneously pay attention to causal relations.
This debate has just been enriched by Hauser and Spaulding's [8] report that rhesus monkeys -a non-tool-using species with little interest in objects which is relatively distant from humans -understand causal relations involving tools. The authors showed wild rhesus monkeys sequences such as those illustrated in Figure 1 . In one example, an experimenter placed an apple on a platform, erected a screen, then lowered and lifted a knife behind the screen. When the screen was removed, the apple appeared cut in two halves. Alternatively, the same sequence -from intact apple to halved apple -was shown, but instead of a knife the experimenter lowered a drinking glass behind the screen. In both cases the experimenter surreptitiously replaced the whole apple with a halved one. Humans would assume that, in the first sequence, the experimenter cut the apple with the knife, but they would find surprising the same outcome in the sequence with the glass. We know that knives, but not glasses, have the causal power of cutting.
How can we tell what the monkeys thought of these sequences? Hauser and Spaulding [8] applied a technique that developmental psychologists use with human babies: they measured how long the monkeys looked at the cut apple in each sequence, on the assumption that monkeys, like babies, would look longer at anything violating their expectations. And they found that the monkeys indeed looked longer at the 'impossible' outcome of an apple cut with a glass than at the 'possible' outcome involving the knife. Moreover, they also looked longer at the impossible event of a cut apple reappearing as a whole apple after using a knife behind the screen, which suggests that monkeys were not acting on a loose association between knives and cut pieces of food, but paid attention to the order of events. Similar results were obtained with a different transformation: a white piece of cloth dyed with blue paint versus the same effect involving a knife.
The news is not just that rhesus monkeys may show causal understanding of a type until now reported only in highly trained laboratory chimpanzees [3] . More surprising is that the monkeys had no direct experience of using knives, dyes or other tools. And, according to the new report [8] , their vicarious experience of seeing human visitors cut food with knives, drink with glasses or dye with paint was very limited, if any at all. It seems that the monkeys have either a fabulous capacity for vicarious learning of causal relations in one-off events or, as Hauser and Spaulding [8] suggest, a natural tendency to draw novel causal inferences from their general knowledge of objects, including objects they have never personally handled. Although the report may downplay the amount of causal experience of the monkeys -surely they spend much time daily picking and chewing food items, and experiencing the resulting transformations -their performance in the looking tests remains impressive.
But can we really infer so much from looking times? Does an average extra second and a half of attention justify the attribution of sophisticated causal knowledge to the monkeys? In developmental psychology, looking time has been used to argue for complex physical and social knowledge in very young infants incapable of complex actions [9] , but there is some controversy about the significance of such measures. Most agree that looking time does reflect some form of early knowledge, but there is disagreement about how similar this is to the knowledge used in explicit adaptive action [10] .
Looking time methods pose a special problem when applied to non-human primates. Perception-action mismatches in human infants can be understood as transitional phases in the development of mature skills. But what is the point of permanent perception-action mismatches in adult monkeys? Why does a species that rarely uses objects have such an astonishing ability to understand the causal mechanics of objects used by others? What is the evolutionary point of acquiring knowledge that is not put to practical use? [11] . Is this a by-product of more general abilities that do have an adaptive impact? Perhaps attending to 'odd' events is advantageous in other areas in which the monkeys do develop adaptive actions, but here they just look longer without knowing why their attention is caught by sequences such as 'apple-glass-cut apple'? But then what exactly catches their eye if not the causal anomalies of glasses cutting apples and knives colouring clothes?
Hauser and Spaulding's [8] study is an important and exciting contribution to the body of evidence contradicting Hume's assumptions about causal cognition. Causal understanding of novel object relations may be an evolutionary primitive of cognition requiring a relatively modest amount of experience with objects, and not the result of generalising from human-like massive object experience. But it is also a challenging reminder of the need to address the riddle of the contrast between perceptual knowledge and knowledge for adaptive action, which now matters not only in cognitive development but also in cognitive evolution. Figure 1 . Some of the possible and impossible sequences shown by Hauser and Spaulding [8] to rhesus monkeys. The monkeys looked significantly longer (3.65 seconds on average) to the impossible outcomes than to the possible ones (1.96 seconds on average) during the 10 seconds following the withdrawal of the screen. (Adapted with permission from [8] .)
